

RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

OF AN

INVESTIGATION

CONDUCTED AT

THE NAVAL OPERATING BASE

QUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA

AND ON BOARD

THE U.S.S. HYADES

BY ORDER OF

THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET

To investigate the actions of the personnel of the
U.S.S. Hyades in connection with the loss of the
U.S.S. Warrington

September 17, 1944

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED

FROM *Confidential*
TO *Unclassified*
auth: jg Ste 8/5/7/47

To the J.A.G.

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FINDING OF FACTS

1. That on 9 September the USS WARRINGTON and the USS HYADES were under the operational control of Commander Service Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet.
2. That on 9 September Commander Service Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet issued an operational despatch (Exhibit number 4) which in substance directed the USS HYADES and the USS WARRINGTON to proceed in company on 10 September toward the Canal Zone and at a designated point on the Northern boundary of the Panama Sea Frontier, to separate and proceed independently as follows: The USS WARRINGTON to Trinidad, the USS HYADES to Panama Canal Zone.
3. That ComServLant operational despatch designated the Commanding Officer of the USS HYADES as senior officer of the movement.
4. That Commander _____, U.S. Naval Reserve, was Commanding Officer of the USS HYADES.
5. That Commander _____, U.S. Navy, was Commanding Officer of the USS WARRINGTON.
6. That the Commanding Officer of the USS HYADES, as senior officer of the prospective movement, originated and issued a number movement despatch (HYADES 101828 of September, 1944, Exhibit/5).
7. That prior to the departure of the USS HYADES and the USS WARRINGTON a communication plan was discussed between representatives of the two vessels and of ComServLant.
8. That a final communication plan was prepared and issued by the USS HYADES and delivered to appropriate personnel of the USS WARRINGTON.
9. That the Communication Plan (Exhibit number 143) in addition to other provisions, required both vessels to guard NSS FOX schedule broadcasts at all times during the voyage.
10. That prior to departure of the movement the Commanding Officer of the USS HYADES, as senior officer, issued verbal instructions as to the zig-zag plans and other tactical information and policies to be observed enroute.

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11. That according to the records upon departure, there were on board the USS WARRINGTON twenty officers and two hundred ninety-five enlisted men as shown in exhibit numbers 178 and 177 respectively.

12. That upon departure from Norfolk the USS WARRINGTON had on board approximately 176,000 gallons of fuel oil and 30,000 gallons of fresh water, a normal amount of ammunition, provisions, and stores.

13. That the draft of the USS WARRINGTON upon departure was approximately 13.5 feet forward and 14 feet aft, a mean draft of 13.75 feet, corresponding to 2835 tons displacement.

14. That shortly after getting underway, the USS WARRINGTON set material Condition "Baker".

15. That as of 10 September the officers of the USS WARRINGTON were assigned duties as indicated:

.. Commander U.S. Navy	Commanding
.. Lt D-V(G) USNR	Executive Officer
.. Lt D-V(G) USNR	Navigator
✓ Davis, E. S., Lt D-V(S) USNR	Sound Officer
✓ Hart, J. P., Lt(jg) D-V(G) USNR	Communication Officer
✓ Pack, C. S., Lt(jg) D-E-V(G) USNR	Gunnery Officer
✓ Keppel, W. V., Lt(jg) E-V(G) USNR	Engineering Officer
✓ Pennington, J. M., Jr., Lt(jg) D-V(G) USNR	First Lieutenant and Damage Control Officer
✓ Moore, R. B., Lt(jg) E-V(G) USNR	Assistant Engineering Officer
✓ Kroll, R. L., Lt(jg) D-V(G) USNR	Assistant Gunnery Officer
✓ Denney, J., Jr., Lt(jg) D-V(G) USNR	Assistant Communication Officer
✓ Johnson, G. W., Lt(jg) D-V(G) USNR	Torpedo Officer
.. Lt(jg) D-V(G) USNR	Ship's Secretary
✓ Sullivan, J. R., Ens D-V(S) USNR	In Training
.. Ens D-V(G) USNR	Assistant Gunnery Officer
✓ Dicken, J. R., Ens D-V(G) USNR	Assistant First Lieutenant
✓ Kennedy, R. M., Lt(jg) M-C-V(G) USNR	Medical Officer
✓ Vickers, S. M., Lt(jg) S-C-V(G) USNR	Supply Officer
✓ Luerssen, T. S., Ens E-V(G) USNR	Assistant Communication Officer
✓ Rogers, W. H., Ens D-V(G) USNR	In Training

16. That the USS HYADES and the USS WARRINGTON got underway from Norfolk on 10 September 1944 and at 0111, 11 September, took departure on point Gray Sugar of the swept channel to the Chesapeake entrance.

17. That the designated speed of advance of the movement was fourteen knots.

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18. That at some time, either prior to, or after getting underway, on 10 September, both the USS HYADES and the USS WASHINGTON received an advisory (CLIP 101857, Exhibit number 6) as to the existence of a hurricane centered near twenty six degrees north latitude and sixty five degrees west longitude.

19. That by 0800, 12 September, via NSS FOX broadcasts the USS WASHINGTON had received several hurricane warnings and the USS HYADES had received a total of ten warnings.

20. That at about 0925, 12 September, the Commanding Officer of the USS WASHINGTON sent a visual message to the USS HYADES recommending that the movement discontinue zig-zagging in order to increase the speed of advance, and thus pass ahead of the approaching hurricane by a wider margin.

21. That the Commanding Officer of the USS HYADES in a reply to the USS WASHINGTON rejected the suggestion to discontinue zig-zagging and stated that information received from Miami at 0830 indicated to him that the hurricane center was stationary. That this message cannot be located in the communication record or message file of the USS HYADES nor can one be located that indicates the hurricane center to be stationary at 0830, 12 September 1944.

22. That about 0925, 12 September it was the opinion of the Commanding Officer of the USS WASHINGTON that the center of the hurricane would pass eastern of him, and that, on the other hand, the Commanding Officer of the USS HYADES was of the opinion that the center of the hurricane would pass ahead of him. These opinions were not exchanged.

23. That at 0942, 12 September, the Commanding Officer of the USS HYADES increased speed by about one-half knot to fifteen and a half knots.

24. That despite the earlier rejection of the suggestion submitted by the USS WASHINGTON to cease zig-zagging, the Commanding Officer of the USS HYADES at 1153, 12 September, made the signal "cease zig-zagging and resume base course."

25. That at 1222, 12 September the HYADES received a hurricane warning (Exhibit 16) originated by Commander Gulf Sea Frontier, quoted as follows:

"THE HURRICANE WAS CENTERED NEAR 26 DEGREES NORTH AND 72 DEGREES WEST AT 1200 ZERRA MOVING WESTWARD AT ABOUT EIGHT KNOTS X THIS IS A LARGE AND SEVERE STORM X WINDS OF FULL HURRICANE FORCE EXISTING WITHIN 75 MILES OF CENTER AND WINDS OF FORCE EIGHT OR GREATER HAVING A RADIUS OF 200 MILES FROM CENTER."

(Note: TOR ascertained from NSS transmission times.)

26. That the track of the hurricane center was plotted by the USS HYADES and the USS WARRINGTON from the advisory warnings received over NSS FOX Broadcasts but that neither the USS HYADES nor the USS WARRINGTON made a plot of the location of the center of the storm from their actual observation of weather phenomenon, nor was the North Atlantic Pilot chart for September consulted by either Commanding Officer.

27. That the barometer readings in the deck log of the USS HYADES at times and dates indicated, show the following:

<u>TIME</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>BAROMETER</u>
0100	11 September	30.12
2400	11 September	30.00
0900	12 September	29.86
1200	12 September	29.80
1300	12 September	29.76
1400	12 September	29.72

28. That an analysis of the foregoing readings indicates that in a period of 23 hours beginning 0100 on 11 September the barometer fell .12 inch; that in the next succeeding 8 hour period the barometer fell .14 inch; that in the next four hour period the barometer fell .06 inch and that at 1200, 12 September the barometer commenced to fall at a rate of .04 inch per hour.

29. That at 1400, 12 September the advisories on hand in the USS HYADES indicated that the center of the storm was within about 200 miles of the USS HYADES and the USS WARRINGTON, bearing approximately 160 degrees to 165 degrees true.

30. That after the receipt of the advisory, quoted in fact 26, the USS HYADES and the USS WARRINGTON continued at a speed of approximately 15.5 knots on a course 183 degrees true which was a collision course with the storm center.

31. That at about 1430 on 12 September the Commanding Officer of the USS WARRINGTON had the word passed throughout his vessel to "prepare for hurricane weather."

32. That at the time of passing the word to secure for hurricane weather, the USS WASHINGTON was steaming with split plant operation as follows: number one boiler supplying steam to the port engines and the after engine room; number four boiler supplying steam to the starboard engines and the forward engine room.

33. That pursuant to the order to prepare for hurricane weather the personnel on the USS WASHINGTON proceeded to: secure all topside and below deck moveable gear, rig additional gripes for the motor whale boat, (not rigged inboard) and affix covers to the forced draft blower intakes except:-

- (a) Two covers for number two blower, which was an operating blower.
- (b) One cover for number three blower, missing.
- (c) One cover for number four blower, missing.
- (d) One cover for number eight blower, which was an operating blower.
- (e) One cover for number seven blower, missing.

34. That in securing the covers to the forced draft blower intakes, some were found bent and a number of the securing dogs were found to be heavily painted, others bent, and some missing.

35. That the forced draft blower intake covers were of a portable type and were customarily stowed in racks attached to the trunk of the blower, and that it appears that the missing covers were not on board when the WASHINGTON departed from Norfolk.

36. That the forced draft blower intake covers were not numbered for ready identification but were fitted by trial and error.

37. That as a matter of routine, the deck force of the USS WASHINGTON was charged with the cleanliness and appearance of the covers and the external surfaces of the intake trunks and painted them periodically.

38. That as of 12 September the number of blowers, exhaust and supply, for the engine rooms of the USS WASHINGTON, and their external arrangement and location were as shown on BuShips drawing number 210252, Exhibit number 155.

39. That in preparing the USS WARRINGTON for hurricane weather the outside covers were affixed to some of the blower openings of both forward and after engine rooms and the cowls of blowers 1-104-1 and 1-104-2 of the forward engine room were trained inboard. That at the time two (2) exhaust blowers were inoperative due to some previous mechanical failure.

40. That some of the dogs required for securing the weather deck covers of the engine room blower openings were missing and others were found to be painted.

41. That as the afternoon of the twelfth of September advanced, the weather became progressively worse and the barometer continued to drop at a rate of approximately .04 inch per hour.

42. That at about 1810, 12 September the USS WARRINGTON heave to on a course of about 110 degrees (true) speed six knots, because heavy seas from port had damaged the port bulwarks.

43. That after the USS WARRINGTON heave to, the wind was about one point on the port bow.

44. That after heaving to, the USS WARRINGTON and USS HYADES exchanged visual messages as follows:

<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>TEXT</u>
USS WARRINGTON	USS HYADES	Am forced to heave to.
USS HYADES	USS WARRINGTON	Heave to at your discretion.
USS HYADES	USS WARRINGTON	Do you wish us to standby you?
USS WARRINGTON	USS HYADES	Negat, will pick you up after the storm.
USS WARRINGTON	USS HYADES	In case we separate will communicate with you on two eight eight five KCS.

45. That after the exchange of the foregoing messages, the USS HYADES continued on course 133 degrees (true), speed 15 knots until 1815, 12 September at which time the USS HYADES similarly decided to heave to, whereupon speed was reduced to 11 knots and the course of the vessel altered to port, and that at 1835 the USS HYADES was steadied on a course 137 degrees (true).

46. That the changes of course and speed of the USS HYADES occurring between 1815 and 1835, 12 September were not communicated to the USS WARRINGTON, nor were the course and the speed of the USS WARRINGTON communicated to the USS HYADES.

47. That when the USS HYADES steadied on course 137 degrees true, the direction of the true wind, as reported in the HYADES log, was from 110 degrees (true), force 9, and the barometer reading was 29.42.
48. That the USS WARRINGTON at about 2300, on 12 September suffered a machinery derangement in the forward engine room which resulted in a loss of main engine power and electrical power, and that it appears that the derangement was due to mal-operation of the plant and not due to the entrance of sea water.
49. That prior to the derangement, number one main generator turbine was in operation and exhausting into number one main condenser.
50. That the machinery derangement at 2300 appears to have developed as follows:- loss of suction of the main condensate and booster pump whereupon this pump was shut down and the electric condensate pump started; however, in shifting from the steam driven pump to the electric pump a suction valve was not opened and the condenser rapidly lost vacuum, which was followed by number one main generator tripping out. The starboard throttle was closed and "stop" was rung up on the engine telegraph.
51. That shortly before the occurrence of the machinery derangement, trouble had been experienced with the forward engine room main injection flapper valve, swinging open and shut with the roll of the ship.
52. That when the USS WARRINGTON lost main electrical power at about 2300, number one and number two diesel driven auxiliary generators automatically cut in and provided auxiliary electrical power throughout the ship. However, very shortly after cutting in, the number two diesel engine stopped. A subsequent examination of number two diesel engine revealed that the engine had been wrecked by water in the combustion spaces.
53. It appears that the exhaust piping outlet of number two diesel engine had been lowered when 40mm mounts were installed in Panama about May 1943 and that the outlet was relocated on the after deck house and was not as shown in BuShips Dwg. number 0919. Exhibit number 154.
54. That number one diesel driven auxiliary generator was continued in operation until main electric power was restored.
55. That when number one diesel generator was stopped, an inspection of the engine crank case showed the presence of some water.
56. That at the time number one diesel driven generator was shut down, the deck of the compartment was wet.
57. That immediately following the machinery derangement, orders were issued to arouse and direct all engineering personnel to report to their stations in the main machinery spaces.

58. That at the time of the machinery derangement, the temperatures in the engine rooms began to rise and the operating personnel began to suffer from heat. That when the electrical power was lost, steering control was shifted to the steering engine room.

59. That with the loss of main electrical power and main engine power at about 2300, the USS WARRINGTON lost headway and steering and, as a result of the ship's head fell off to the southward into the trough of the seas.

60. That main electric and main engine power was regained at about 2330 with number two main generator in use.

61. That after regaining power, at 2330 12 September, efforts to bring the USS WARRINGTON to an easterly heading by steering by truck wheel from the steering engine room were unsuccessful because of improper response to orders from the bridge, whereupon control was shifted to the bridge and the heading of the vessel was then maneuvered into the seas.

62. That up to the time of the occurrence of the machinery derangement in the forward engine room, the USS WARRINGTON had taken relatively small amounts of water in the:

- (a) Forward Engine Room.
- (b) After Fire Room.
- (c) Steering Engine Room
- (d) Forward Diesel Engine Room.

63. That at about 2300 there was about one foot of water in the steering engine room which had entered that compartment at some prior time through the ventilation system and a leaking deck hatch.

64. That at about the time main electrical power was regained, at least two external covers were removed from the engine room blower openings in the deck house and attempts were made to start the blowers. When blowers failed to start the covers were ordered replaced. The replacement of covers was reported accomplished at some later time but it also appears that these covers were later carried away.

65. That after 2300, 12 September, none of the engine room blowers, either exhaust or supply, were ever again in operation.

66. That about the time the USS WARRINGTON regained main engine power, high temperatures existed in both engine rooms and this condition became progressively worse to a point where personnel could not remain on watch for more than five to ten minutes at a time.

67. That after 2330, 12 September, the USS WARRINGTON experienced momentary losses of steering control at various times which were attributed to faulty operation of the selsyn transmission system between bridge and steering engine.

68. That despite the several losses of steering, the control was retained on the bridge, throughout the entire night.

69. That between 2330, 12 September and 0030 on 13 September, the USS WAR-INGTON was taking various but comparatively small amounts of water into the engine rooms through the ventilation systems, and into the after fire room through number seven and number eight forced draft blower intakes.

70. That the water entering the forward engine room was being kept well under control by the use of number three fire and bilge pump located in the engine room.

71. That the water entering the after engine room was of a negligible quantity.

72. That a very small quantity of water was entering the forward fire room through number three and number four forced draft blower intakes which required the occasional use of number one fire and bilge pump on the bilges.

73. That the after fire room was taking water through number seven and number eight forced draft blower intakes to a degree that required the continuous use of number two fire and bilge pump, and the use of number one fire and bilge pump whenever the latter was not in use in the forward fire room.

74. That the aforesaid pumping operations in the various machinery spaces were keeping the level of the water below the deck plates and under control.

75. That some time during the evening of 12 September number eight forced draft blower was stopped and number seven forced draft blower was placed in use.

76. That at some indeterminate time during that night of 12 September, a cover on number eight forced draft blower intake came adrift and was not replaced, presumably washed overboard.

77. That at some time between 0030 and 0100 the USS WAR-INGTON reversed course turning to starboard, at a speed of fifteen knots to run before the sea.

78. That after the aforesaid reversal of course, the USS WAR-INGTON steadied on heading 280 degrees true.

79. That over a considerable period of time, and prior to the reversal of course, the Commanding Officer, USS WARRINGTON, stated that he had received numerous and alarming reports from the Engineer Officer to the effect that:

- (a) Heat conditions in the main engine room were deplorable.
- (b) Due to the heat conditions he was uncertain as to whether the plant could be kept in operation for any length of time.
- (c) Numerous difficulties were being experienced with various machinery.
- (d) The forward engine room was taking water faster than could be handled.

80. That the Commanding Officer, USS WARRINGTON, states that the reports of the Engineering Officer influenced him to such a degree that he decided to reverse course and run before the wind and sea to outrun the storm, but it appears that the Commanding Officer had considered this course of action at about 2000, 12 September and before any difficulties were experienced.

81. That the testimony of experienced surviving engine room personnel indicates that the heat conditions in the engine rooms caused no great concern among the engine room personnel and that the situation, prior to loss of power, was being satisfactorily met by standing watches in relays; further, that this procedure had been employed on at least two previous occasions when the vessel was in the Pacific and had lost engine room ventilation.

82. That none of the testimony indicates that, up to the time the USS WARRINGTON reversed course, were any of the fire rooms or engine rooms taking water faster than could be handled by pumps available and then in operation.

83. That shortly after the USS WARRINGTON was steadied on course 280 degrees true, the Commanding Officer left the bridge in company with Lieutenant _____ the navigator, and then proceeded to the forward engine room with the intention of conferring with the Engineer Officer, Lieutenant W. V. Keppel.

84. That the Commanding Officer, the Engineer Officer, and Lieutenant _____, entered the forward engine room by the port forward escape hatch and were on the control level platform when the USS WARRINGTON took a deep roll to starboard.

85. That as the vessel rolled deeply to starboard, a large amount of water entered the forward engine room through the ventilation ducts and port escape hatch and several events occurred in rapid succession as follows:

- (a) Loss of main electrical power throughout the ship.
- (b) Throttle to starboard main engine closed by the order of the Engineer Officer, and with the approval of the Commanding Officer.
- (c) Forward engine room abandoned on orders of the Engineer Officer.

86. That it appears that the port main engine stopped at about the same time or shortly after the starboard engine was stopped.

87. That when the forward engine room was abandoned the first time, the free water in the compartment was below the lower grating. At some later time the compartment was reentered and it was stated that some machinery was put into operation, also that the main circulator could not get a suction through the ten inch bilge connection because of low water level in bilges and decided starboard list.

88. That from the testimony it appears that whether or not any machinery in the forward engine room was again placed in operation is open to question.

88A. That as the large amount of water entered the forward engine room, simultaneously took a quantity of water which the fire room personnel describe as rising rapidly from below the deck plate s to just below the upper grating level, requiring that No. 4 boiler be secured.

89. That although it was stated that when number four boiler was secured, the line stop valves in the after fire room were lined up to permit number one boiler to supply steam to the starboard engine as well as the port engine, subsequent events make it appear that this action was not taken, nor that the boiler was isolated from the main steam line.

90. That although the water was stated to have risen rapidly to the level of the fire room upper grating, there was no indication of a rupture of the tubes or pressure fittings of the boiler.

91. That at the time the after fire room flooded none of the personnel therein saw any evidence of a rupture or opening in the overhead or hull plating.

92. That two of the fire room personnel on watch at the time did not know of the existence of the closure fitting in the fire room exhaust blower system.

93. That shortly after number four boiler was secured the Engineer Officer, Lieutenant Keppel, entered the fire room and saw conditions, and approved the abandonment of the compartment.

94. That the after fire room was entered by the port access hatch at about 0530, 13 September by a member of the forward fire room watch who states that the water level in the fire room on the port side was then just above the upper gratings.

95. It appears that the deep roll to starboard was caused by a sheer of the vessel to port which placed the USS WARRINGTON broadside to the seas at a speed of fifteen knots.

96. That the vessel had been steaming on a westerly course for approximately twenty to thirty minutes prior to broaching.

97. That it appears that none of the main engines of the USS WARRINGTON were ever again in use following the broaching incident.

98. That about 0130, 13 September the USS WARRINGTON sent out a call for assistance by emergency radio.

99. That an SOS from the USS WARRINGTON was heard on 8470 kcs at 0133 by Radio Balboa, and Radio San Francisco.

100. That after leaving the forward engine room the Commanding Officer returned to the bridge and shortly thereafter, ordered the jettisoning of topside weight.

101. That just prior to, or just after issuing the jettison order, the motor whale boat was cut loose because of its severely damaged condition.

102. That in pursuance to the jettisoning order, all topside 20MM and 40MM ammunition was thrown overboard and eight (8) torpedoes were fired to starboard.
103. That some time between 0200 and 0230, 13 September, the forward diesel engine, supplied auxiliary electrical power to the forward part of the vessel for a period of about forty-five (45) minutes.
104. That with auxiliary electrical power, the main radio of the USS WARRINGTON succeeded in establishing communication from 0233 to 0257, 13 September with Radio New York on 2716 KCS and transmitted a distress message.
105. That the distress message gave the USS WARRINGTON'S position as Latitude 27°-57' North and Longitude 73°-44' West.
106. That the USS WARRINGTON'S distress message was intercepted on 2716 KCS by several stations.
107. That Radio New York passed the USS WARRINGTON'S distress message to Navy Department and Commander Eastern Sea Frontier.
108. That the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, rebroadcast USS WARRINGTON'S distress message over NSS FOX, No. W2196 in plain language at 0317, 13 September 1944. (Exhibit 38)
109. That the last radio transmission heard from the USS WARRINGTON was at 0257, 13 September 1944.
110. That at 0327, 13 September a plain language message originated by Commander Eastern Sea Frontier was broadcast on NSS FOX schedule to the USS ATR-9 and the USS ATR-62, directing those vessels to proceed to latitude 27°-57' north and longitude 73°-44' west and render assistance to a vessel in distress.
111. That at about 0300 water in the forward diesel compartment short circuited the bus bars of the generator control panel and the diesel engine was stopped by order of the Engineer Officer.
112. That efforts were made to remove water from the forward diesel engine compartment by the use of a gasoline engine handy billy and a bucket brigade. These efforts were discontinued when the handy billy could not be started.
113. That no effort was made to ascertain the source of entry of water into the diesel engine room.
114. That the hinged cover of the exhaust blower opening in the forward diesel engine compartment had been removed for some time long prior to the departure of the USS WARRINGTON from Norfolk.
115. That, after number one diesel engine was stopped, the Engineer Officer ordered the door between the IG room and the diesel engine room closed. But neither the natural vent nor the exhaust vent openings of the compartment was closed or plugged; nor was any closure effected in the diesel engine exhaust piping.

116. That it appears that the forward diesel engine air intake piping in the diesel compartment had been blank flanged for about two and one-half years.

117. That at some period following the flooding of the after fire room the main feed pumps failed, whereupon emergency feed was utilized for number one boiler and continued until 0520, 13 September at which time feed water ran out. Other feed tanks controlled by a manifold in the after fire room could not be utilized because the manifold could not be reached. An effort to use salt water feed was unsuccessful, and at about 0540 the forward fire room was ordered abandoned by _____, chief water tender, a survivor.

118. That the Commanding Officer was not always informed when engineering compartments were abandoned nor was he informed as to the necessity therefor.

119. That, when the forward fire room was abandoned, only the burners of number one boiler had been secured and the steam pressure expended itself through the fire and bilge pump which was left running and taking a suction on the bilges.

120. That the water in bilges at the time of abandonment was at about floor plate level. After abandonment, water continued to enter the forward fire room in small quantities through number three and number four forced draft blower intakes, and the exhaust blower ventilation opening in the fire room overhead.

121. That the fitting provided to close the forward fire room exhaust ventilation was inoperative, and the exhaust system could not be closed.

122. That the following measures were taken to control flooding, improve stability and correct list:

- (a) Use of fire and bilge and main circulating pumps until breaching incident.
- (b) Formation of bucket brigades to bail out forward fire room, forward and after engine rooms and engineers' living compartment.
- (c) Use of bedding in one or more outlets of the ventilation piping in the forward engine room.
- (d) Use of bedding in a ventilation outlet in the engineers' living compartment.
- (e) Foremast stays cut, which permitted the upper section of the mast and radar antennae to carry away.
- (f) Release of starboard anchor with five fathom shot.
- (g) Jettisoning of topside ammunition, torpedoes, 20MM gun barrels, and other moveable topside gear.

123. That the bedding utilized to stop the influx of water was not shored, wedged or properly secured. That these efforts to prevent the inflow of water were not a part of any organized ship's effort to control flooding.

124. That the damage control parties were not summoned to their respective stations, nor led, nor employed as a group to control flooding; nor was the shoring material and other damage control equipment on board utilized in any concerted or coordinated effort to stop the inflow of water through the external or internal openings of the ventilation system.

125. That at no time was an emergency "All Hands" status established which required the manning of sound powered telephone headsets at all stations in order to provide communication throughout the ship.

126. That after midnight, 12 September, the USS WARRINGTON continued to take varying amounts of water into the machinery spaces through ventilation openings and through deck hatches, which had been left open for ventilation purposes, or had worked open and remained so for unknown periods of time.

127. That, by the time the abandonment of the engineering spaces had begun, the ship had a heavy list to starboard which gradually increased as the level of water rose in the engineering spaces.

128. That at about 0700, 13 September, water was present in the following spaces as indicated:

- (a) Forward diesel generator room - three feet or more above the deck.
- (b) IC Room - less than one foot above the deck.
- (c) Number one fire room - slightly above floor plates.
- (d) Number two fire room - completely flooded.
- (e) Forward engine room - below upper grating.
- (f) After engine room - four feet above lower grating.
- (g) Engineers' living spaces - less than two feet above deck.
- (h) Steering engine compartment - less than two feet above deck.
- (i) Galley - less than three feet above deck.

129. That at no time during the critical period were any gasoline handily billy pumps successfully placed in operation.

130. That at about 1000, 13 September, the Commanding Officer of the USS WARRINGTON ordered the large number of personnel then congregated on the bridge and the bridge spaces, to proceed with him to the Squadron Commander's cabin for the purpose of reducing topside weight, and to await events.

131. That Lieutenant _____, Lieutenant J.P. Hart, and Ensign J.R. Dicken remained on the bridge and did not comply with the aforesaid order.

132. That at about 1230, 13 September, the Commanding Officer of the USS WARRINGTON ordered all hands to line up on the port side and prepare to abandon ship; that, when this word reached the after part of the ship, Lieutenant^(U.S.) L.R. Kroll was the only officer in that section and he was then engaged in supervising a bucket brigade in an endeavor to bail out the after engine room.

133. That at about 1300, 13 September the list of the USS WARRINGTON to starboard had increased to about seventy five degrees.

134. That personnel forward began to abandon ship at about 1300, 13 September and that the personnel aft followed when they saw the forward groups leaving the vessel.

135. That all officers other than Lieutenant^(U.S.) L.R. Kroll, Lieutenant W.V. Keppel, and the medical officer, Lieutenant R.M. Kennedy, abandoned ship from the vicinity of the bridge, and superstructure section.

136. That the Medical Officer, Lieutenant R.M. Kennedy, was last seen in the main radio room attending Chief Radioman Tolman, who had sustained a broken leg during the night; that neither of these persons was seen to leave the ship.

137. That Lieutenant Keppel was last seen on the bridge structure without a life jacket and was not seen to leave the ship.

138. That prior to abandoning ship, no organized inspection was made to ascertain that:

- (a) All personnel were informed of the intention to abandon ship.
- (b) All personnel were properly equipped with life jackets.
- (c) The wounded were first cared for.

139. That no effort was made to assign and distribute personnel to available rafts and nets.

140. That of the eight rafts and five nets in the USS WARRINGTON at the time the vessel departed Norfolk, six rafts and two nets were available to personnel at the time of abandoning ship; the balance had been either washed overboard, cast loose, or lost at some time prior to abandoning ship.

141. That personnel swam to the nearest raft or net which resulted in improper distribution. The number of men grouped about the individual rafts and nets varied from eight to fifty.

142. That at about 1315, 13 September, the bow of the USS WARRINGTON was observed to rise out of the water, and immediately thereafter the ship sank stern first in position estimated as Latitude 28°-26'N Longitude 73°-53'W.

143. That insofar as can be determined none of the records, nor the charts nor public notices of the USS WASHINGTON were saved; that the secret and confidential publications went down with the ship.

144. That the last accurate position of the USS WASHINGTON had been determined at 1400, 12 September, by Loran fix.

145. That immediately prior to the time the USS WASHINGTON sank, the vessel had fuel and fresh water on board to about eighty five percent of capacity; the fire rooms were completely flooded; the engine rooms flooded, and water was present in various amounts in the after living spaces, the steering engine room, galley, forward diesel engine room and other spaces forward.

146. That immediately following the sinking of the USS WASHINGTON, two or three depth charges exploded in rapid succession but it does not appear that any lives were lost or serious injuries sustained as a result thereof.

✓ 147. That personnel began to drown shortly after entering the water.

✓ 148. That, during the period 13-14 September, disorders among the personnel aboard the several rafts and floater nets caused the drowning or exhaustion and subsequent death of an indeterminate number of persons.

149. That the rescued personnel now surviving were distributed at the time of their rescue among six rafts and two floater nets; that the six rafts, at the time of rescue, contained surviving officers and men, as follows:

1. Fourteen with Lt. _____, senior.
2. Six with Comdr. _____, senior.
3. Eight with _____, Chief, senior.
4. Seventeen with _____, BoM2c, senior.
5. Nine with _____, BoM2c, senior.
6. Ten with _____, BM2c, senior.

and the two floater nets, each containing four men at the time of rescue, were respectively in charge of _____, CWT and _____, GM2c.

That _____, radarman third class, never reached a raft or floater net but remained alone in the water until rescue, supported by a rubber life belt.

That the following personnel were rescued but died prior to their return to Norfolk, Virginia:

Rayburg, Sylvester A., Jr.	GM2c
Lapp, Carl C.	Slc
Bieneff, James F.	SPc
Anderson, Emil E.	Slc
Springel, Walter	S2c

150. That some personnel became entangled in floater nets and drowned before they could be released.

151. That it appears that floater nets were generally unsatisfactory in the heavy seas and that upon rescue only four survivors were taken from each net although starting with about thirty five and twenty nine men respectively.

152. That about nightfall of 13 September the wind had decreased appreciably in velocity, but the seas remained high until about daylight on 14 September.

153. That on 14 September, planes and ships were seen by surviving personnel as follows:

At about:

1000	1 PBV plane.
1030 to 1100	Ship of Cargo or Merchant type.
1030 to 1100	Cargo Ship with small escort (4000 to 8000 yards).
1530	1 PBV plane.

154. That surviving personnel's first contact with any rescuing agency was by collision between the USS HYADES and the life raft in which Lieutenant _____ was senior, at 0430, 15 September.

155. That shortly after parting company with the USS WARRINGTON on 13 September, the USS HYADES, in leaving to, maneuvered to see wind on sea on her port bow. This was continued throughout the night at an engine speed of about 11 knots until 1000, 15 September, at which time a southerly course was laid for San Salvador to resume voyage at an increased speed of 12 knots.

156. That none of the movements or intentions of the USS HYADES were communicated to the USS WARRINGTON or any other ship or naval activity.

157. That radar contact was lost between ships as follows:

- (a) USS HYADES on USS WARRINGTON about 2100, 12 September at a range of 27,000 yards.
- (b) USS WARRINGTON on USS HYADES at about 2300, 12 September at a range of 55,000 yards.

158. That except for minor damage to personnel and materiel the USS HYADES passed through the hurricane without incident, transvering the low pressure area between 0200 and 0300, 13 September.

159. That the USS HYADES' communication records for the night of 12-13 September indicate that 2:55 kcs, 300 kcs, NSS FOX (listed in the communication plan), were guarded constantly, together with either 4235 or 5470 kcs.

160. That the USS HYADES' communication records reveal that the re-broadcast of the USS WARINGTON's distress message over NSS FOX as W2196 of 13 September, was marked "unintelligible" and was filed without action (Exhibit 162(31)). (Note: This fact does not appear solely from an inspection of Exhibit 162(31), but Exhibit 162(31) and 162(32) when compared with Washington broadcasts indicate that the context of the messages is reversed and that the times of receipt of the messages are obviously incorrect.)

161. That an inspection of the USS HYADES' records as submitted indicates that NSS FOX broadcast W2207 (Exhibit 162(33)) was received at 0848, 13 September. This message was addressed to the USS AT-170 and the USS ATR-32 and directed them to proceed to Latitude 27°-57'N, Longitude 73°-44'W, and render assistance to a vessel in distress. (Note: The receipt of this message insofar as it denoted AT-170 as an addressee is in error. The correct addressees are the ATR-9 and ATR-32.)

162. That the "distressed vessel's" position given in Exhibit 162(33) was the same as that given in the USS WARINGTON's distress message, later rebroadcast on NSS FOX as No. W2196 (Exhibit 38).

163. That the "distress position" lies between the USS HYADES 0000, 13 September position and her 0900, 13 September position, both taken from the log, and is about fifty one miles north of the latter position and within five miles of a straight line drawn between the two.

164. That at 1045, 13 September, the USS HYADES received an operational priority coded dispatch, NSS FOX No. W-1265, from ComServLant (Exhibit 162(34)) quoted as follows:

- REPORT IMMEDIATELY PRESENT CONDITION OF YOUR VESSEL AND WEATHER."

(Note: TOR ascertained from NSS Transmission times.)

165. That at 1123, 13 September, the USS HYADES replied, (Exhibit 163(118)):

"CONDITION OF UNIT GOOD WEATHER HEAVY BUT ABATING
PROCEEDING AT REDUCED SPEED."

166. That the information addressees of both messages included the following:

(a) ATR-9, WARRINGTON, ATF-66, ATE-62, CEEF, COSF,
CinClant, ComFourthFlt and Cominch.

(Note: Underscoring by the Court).

167. That, when the USS HYADES replied to ComServLant's message, the USS HYADES had not been in visual or radio communication with the USS WARRINGTON for over 17 hours and had been out of radar contact for over 18 hours.

168. That at 1630, 13 September, the USS HYADES received CinClant's operational priority despatch 131949 as NSS FOX No. W-3314 quoted as follows: (Exhibit 163(96)):

"ARE YOU IN COMPANY WITH WARRINGTON IF YOU PROCEED
IMMEDIATELY TO HER ASSISTANCE STAND BY ON FOUR
HUNDRED KCS OR OTHER LOW FREQUENCY FOR INTERSHIP
COMMUNICATIONS AND SEND WAKE OSCES ON REQUEST TO
ASSIST ATR-9 TO MAKE CONTACT."

(Note: TOR ascertained from NSS Transmission Times.)

169. That at 2045, 13 September, four hours and fifteen minutes after receipt of CinClant's message, the USS HYADES replied, (Exhibit 163(113)) stating that the USS HYADES was not in company with the USS WARRINGTON and was proceeding to assist the USS WARRINGTON at best speed and that the estimated time of contact was eight hours and requested the USS WARRINGTON's position.

170. That the USS HYADES' reply to CinClant was the first information transmitted to any authority indicating that the USS WARRINGTON was not in company.

171. That the Commanding Officer, USS HYADES, as O.T.C. did not at any time report:

1. That the USS WARRINGTON had been forced to heave to.
2. That at 1120, 13 September (when he replied to ComServLant's message) the vessels, had been separated for seventeen hours.
3. That at 2045, 13 September (when he replied to CinClant's message) the vessels had been separated for twenty six hours.

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172. That no position of the USS WARRINGTON was given in CinClant's dispatch directing the USS HYADES to proceed to the assistance of the USS WARRINGTON.

173. That the USS HYADES' estimate of eight (8) hours for contact with the USS WARRINGTON indicated that at best speed contact must have been expected within a radius of one hundred twenty miles. Nevertheless, the USS HYADES requested the USS WARRINGTON's position but did not report own position.

174. That the USS HYADES changed to a northerly course to commence search for the USS WARRINGTON at 2004, 13 September, 1944, a delay of some three (3) hours and thirty-four (34) minutes after receipt of CinClant's operational priority dispatch.

175. That the radio log, supervisor's log, and visual log, all of the USS HYADES, as included in Exhibit 142 are in Zed time.

176. That an inspection of the radio supervisor's log (Exhibit 142) indicates that at 2203 Zed time (1303 Queen), 13 September, the USS WARRINGTON was being called on 3885 kcs; and that at 2303 Zed time (1403 Queen) the USS HYADES shifted to 500 kcs and 400 kcs. The shift to 400 kcs appears to have been done in accordance with CinClant's order.

177. That the time the USS HYADES began to call the USS WARRINGTON on 3885 kcs was: - one hour and thirty eight minutes after receipt of CinClant's dispatch; one hour and fifty six minutes before the USS HYADES changed course to the northward; and two hours and thirty seven minutes before the USS HYADES replied to CinClant with the information that the USS WARRINGTON was not in company.

178. That at 0059, 14 September, the USS HYADES received a dispatch from CinClant over NSS FOX containing the last known position of the USS WARRINGTON. (Note: TOR ascertained by the Court from NSS Transmission Schedule.)

179. That the USS HYADES Captain's night order book of 13-14 September (Exhibit 146) indicated that the USS HYADES expected to arrive in vicinity of USS WARRINGTON at 0400, 14 September, and the course was $345^{\circ}T$.

180. That the USS HYADES log indicated the following navigational courses steered during the night of 13-14 September:

- | | <u>TIME</u> | |
|-----|--------------------|--|
| (a) | 2004, 13 September | changed course from $186^{\circ}T$ to $356^{\circ}T$. |
| (b) | 2045, 13 September | changed course to $345^{\circ}T$. |
| (c) | 0400, 14 September | changed course to $077^{\circ}T$. |

181. That whatever geographical point the USS HYADES was heading for at 2045, 13 September, on course $345^{\circ}T$, no course change was made after receipt of CinClant's message at 0059,

14 September until 0400, 14 September. Therefore, the 2000 13 September position, as given in USS HYADES War Diary, but omitted from the log, is obviously in error and was not used in plotting the course to the USS WARRINGTON's distress position and that it appears therefore that the USS HYADES was heading for the distress position when course was set at 345°T at 2045, 13 September.

182. That at 1015, 14 September, the USS HYADES, for some unknown reason, reduced speed from fifteen knots to one third speed for a period of about fifteen minutes.

183. That several USS WARRINGTON survivors state that a vessel, of merchant type, was seen from the rafts at about 1000, 14 September and that the vessel appeared to stop, lower a boat and then shortly afterwards proceeded on her way.

184. That by nightfall, 14 September 1944, the following ships and planes were participating in search for the USS WARRINGTON:

USS CROATAN	USS DE-146
USS DE-246	USS ATR-9
USS ATR-62	USS HYADES
USS DE-144	USS DE-359
USS DE-145	USS DE-360
USS DE-248	Air Group from the
USS CHEROKEE	USS CROATAN.
	Shore based air groups.

185. That at about midnight, 14 September, CTG 22.5 (in USS CROATAN) was directed by CinCLant to organize and coordinate a combined surface and air search for the USS WARRINGTON.

185.A. That at 0450, 15 September, the USS HYADES collided with a life raft on which Lieutenant [redacted] was senior officer and the USS HYADES stopped and picked up the first USS WARRINGTON survivors.

186. That the USS HYADES, at 0707, 15 September, a period of two hours and seventeen minutes after first contact, reported, by dispatch (Exhibit 162(122)) to CTG 22.5 that USS WARRINGTON survivors rescued by that ship had reported that the vessel capsized.

187. That the navigational position of rescue given in the USS HYADES dispatch was in error and was not corrected until 1020, 15 September in compliance with orders in a CinCLant message received at 0848, 15 September.

188. That the USS HYADES report was the first indication to the searching group and other authorities that the USS WARRINGTON had sunk.

189. That the USS HYADES during the morning and day of 15 September picked up three officers, fifty eight men and one body, the latter identified at DeLee, seaman second class.

190. That at about 1900 on 15 September, the USS HYADES transferred all but three survivors (subsequently buried at sea) and the one body, to the USS HUSE for further transfer to the USS CROATAN and then proceeded toward Guantanamo, Cuba, as directed.

191. That five (5) officers and sixty three men, survivors of the USS WARRINGTON eventually were transferred to the U.S. Naval Hospital, Naval Operating Base, Norfolk, Virginia.

192. That when the USS HYALES set forth from Norfolk on 10 September, the vessel had just recently completed a shake-down period and was on her maiden voyage.

193. That the USS HYALES was the first command held by Commander [redacted] USNR and that his total sea service was about seven years of which four years were in the regular Navy as a Junior officer and three years as a reserve officer on active duty.

194. That the report of a Damage Control Inspection of the USS WARRINGTON (Exhibit 142(3)) conducted by members of the Staff of Commander Destroyers, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, on 3 August 1944, classified the setting of material conditions "Baker" and "Able" as unsatisfactory, and included the following general comment:

"This ship needs an intensive program of damage control training and organization. The principle of division responsibility for setting and maintaining material condition "Baker" should be set up and adhered to. Records in some cases are one year behind. These should be brought up to date. Repair parties need intensive training in setting condition "Able". Steering, Aft crews need drill in operating steering engine by hand. First Lieutenant should be sent to Damage Control School (DesLant ltr. X-23). Obsolete classification of fittings should be changed. A program of intensive drill is needed. DesLant ltr. B-44 should be complied with."

195. That a report (Exhibit 142(10)) of another inspection conducted by representatives of Commander Destroyers, U.S. Atlantic Fleet on 26 August 1944 again listed Conditions "Baker" and "Able" as unsatisfactory, and included the following general summary:

"The First Lieutenant should attend Damage Control School at earliest possible date and take over duties as Damage Control Officer. Classification of Damage Control fittings should be reviewed and revised to conform to Chapter 8 FTP 170 B. C&R records, Hull Books, Repair Record Book and CSIP in particular should be brought up to date. Division responsibility for Material Conditions should be set up and enforced."

196. That Lieutenant [redacted], USNR reported to the USS WARRINGTON on 26 July 1944 and relieved Lieutenant [redacted] USNR, as Executive Officer and Navigator.

197. That on 30 August 1944 Commander [redacted], USN, relieved Lieutenant Commander [redacted], USN, of the command of the USS WARRINGTON.

188. That about 8 September 1944, Lieutenant [redacted] USNR, relieved Lieutenant [redacted] USNR, the Executive Officer, of the duties of navigator.

189. That prior to assuming duties as Navigator, Lieutenant [redacted] had been First Lieutenant and Assistant Damage Control Officer.

190. That Lieutenant (junior grade) J. M. Pennington, USNR, relieved Lieutenant [redacted] USNR of the duties of First Lieutenant and relieved Lieutenant W. V. Keppel, USNR, the Engineer Officer, of the duties of Damage Control Officer.

191. That the transfer of duties from Lieutenant [redacted] USNR, to Lieutenant (junior grade) J. M. Pennington, USNR, had been accomplished by 10 September except for certain records.

192. That Lieutenant (junior grade) J. M. Pennington, USNR, had formerly been First Division Officer and in charge of the Forward Repair Party.

193. That Lieutenant (junior grade) W. V. Keppel, USNR, prior to being relieved by Lieutenant (junior grade) J. M. Pennington, USNR, had held the position of Engineer Officer and of Damage Control Officer for a period of over two years.

194. That the changes in USS WARRINGTON's officer assignments were effected by Commander [redacted] USN, after he had taken command, for the purpose of improving the damage control organization and the ship's administrative organization in general.

195. That the Commanding Officer of the USS WARRINGTON:

- (a) Did not protest to the senior officer the course of the movement when a "vicious" and weather phenomena on hand at about 1400, 12 September 1944, clearly indicated that the course being pursued was leading him toward the hurricane center.
- (b) Did not at any time during the critical hours prior to the sinking of his vessel place the ship in an emergency condition calling for an "All Hands" status.
- (c) Did not set material condition "Able" or equivalent.
- (d) Did not organize personnel and facilities of the USS WARRINGTON into a concerted and coordinated effort to combat the entry of water into the vessel.
- (e) Did not use oil on the surface of the seas.
- (f) Did not use or endeavor to use a sea anchor.
- (g) Did not direct that the wounded be first cared for in abandoning ship.

206. That the Executive Officer:

- (a) Did not report to the Commanding Officer at any time prior to about 0700, 13 September, to ascertain the Commanding Officer's intentions with respect to meeting the emergency.
- (b) Did not ascertain the whereabouts of the Commanding Officer at any time during the same period.
- (c) Did not inform the Commanding Officer of his whereabouts at any time during the same period.
- (d) Did not advise the Commanding Officer of his conclusions when orders inconsistent with them were issued; for example, the Executive Officer, at the time the Commanding Officer issued the order to jettison top side weights, did not consider the vessel in such straits as to require such action.
- (e) Did not adequately acquaint himself with the material and flooding conditions in the ship.
- (f) Did not attempt to coordinate efforts to control the flooding.
- (g) Did not personally inspect the vessel before abandoning ship, or cause it to be inspected, for the purpose of ascertaining if all hands:
 - (1) had received the order to abandon ship and
 - (2) were equipped with life jackets or belts.
- (h) Did not personally inspect the vessel at the time of abandoning ship, or cause it to be inspected, for the purpose of ascertaining if all hands had abandoned ship.
- (i) Did not ascertain at the time of abandoning ship that the wounded were first cared for.

207. That it appears that the actions of Lieutenant (junior grade) L. H. Kroll, USNR, Assistant Gunnery Officer of the USS WASHINGTON on the night of 12 September and morning of 13 September were as follows:

- (a) Directed and assisted in jettisoning ammunition.
- (b) Initiated and directed bailing of water in the flooded spaces by organizing a "bucket brigade", which he secured just before the ship was abandoned.
- (c) Initiated and supervised attempts to plug water openings with improvised means.
- (d) Directed the personnel in abandoning ship in the after part of the ship.
- (e) Assisted weaker personnel while in the water to the detriment of his own condition and strength, leading to the loss of his own life.

208. That the following five officers and sixty-three members of the crew of the USS HARRINGTON survived and appeared before this court:

Commander	U.S. Navy.	Commanding Officer.
Lieutenant	U.S.N.R.	Executive Officer.
Lieutenant	S.N.R.	Navigator.
Lieutenant	U.S.N.R.	Ship's Secretary.
Ensign	U.S.N.R.	Ass't. Gunnery Officer.

<u>NAME</u>	<u>SERVICE NUMBER</u>	<u>RATE</u>
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CBM
BM2c
BM2c
GM2c
GM2c
GM3c
CTM
TM2c
TM2c
TM3c
QM3c
FC3c
SoX3c
RM2c
RM3c
RdM3c
MoM2c
MM2c
CMoM
SF3c
CWT
WT1c
EM1c
SC3c
Slc
Slc
Slc
Slc
Slc
Slc
S2c
Slc
Slc
Slc

Bebe

(208. List of survivors, continued.)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>SERVICE NUMBER</u>	<u>RATE</u>
		S1c
		S1c
		S1c
		S1c
		S1c
		S1c
		S1c
		S1c
		S1c
		S1c
		S1c
		S1c
		S1c
		S2c
		S2c
		S2c
		S2c
		S2c
		S2c
		S2c
		F1c
		F1c
		F2c
		F2c
		F2c
		F2c
		F2c
		S1c
		GM2c
		F1c
		SpM2c
		MM1c
		S2c
		S2c

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209. That the following one hundred forty-seven members of the crew of the USS HARRINGTON were seen to die by one or more witnesses or were buried at sea, and are presumed to be dead.

ADAMS, Ferrard F.,	CM(AA)
ALERS, Julian W.,	SoL2c
ANDRES, Norman I.,	B1c
ARBORETT, Eugene F.,	S2c
BIDLER, Robert C.,	F2c
BIRGER, Andrew L.,	F2c
BASUITI, Bernie A.,	B2c
BOND, Fred W.,	LM2c
BRAD, James A.,	S1c
BRADY, Thomas R.,	SM3c
COLEMAN, Sidney W.,	StL1c
CROSS, Clyde B.,	RL2c
CHAPMAN, Billy R.,	SoL2c
CAMPBELL, Cinnel P.,	StL2c
COOPER, Joseph H.,	StL2c
DE MARCO, Salvatore L.,	RM3c
DAVIDSON, Joseph S.,	LM2c
DILLO, Clarence (n) Jr.,	S2c
DELEE, William (n),	S2c
DELRADI, Joseph (n),	LM3c
DAVIS, Donald C.,	FC3c
DUVALL, Louis (n), Jr.,	S1c
EMERT, Donald T.,	S2c
EDWARDS, Dallas F.,	SM2c
ESTES, Ernest D.,	F2c
BRIDGEMAN, Jake I.,	S2c
EGLIN, Samuel D., Sr.,	S2c
FARIS, Joseph (n),	F2c
FORSTER, Paul V.,	S1c (K)
FERNES, Horace G., Jr.,	TM3c
GILBERT, Ernest (n) Jr.,	LM2c
GARMS, Wendell L.,	Y2c
HEED, Albert F.,	Flc
HENNING, Robert D.,	SM3c
KOY, Kenneth L.,	S1c
KUHL, Harold J.,	MT2c
KILL, Lynn A.,	Flc
KUMBERLY, Robert B., Jr.,	S2c
KAGA, Robert H.,	LM3c
KAYS, Glenn W.,	LM1c
JOHNSON, Charles S.,	S2c
JONES, William J.,	S2c
KAGELAN, Jack,	F2c
GREEN, Frank P.,	Flc
KORSCH, Emil Edward,	S1c
SPRINGEL, Walter,	S2c
SANTINI, Luigi Giovanni,	Flc(LM)
DILLON, Edward Truby	S2c

(List of dead, continued)

JOHNSTON, Harvey L.,	S1c
JOHNS, Talmadge C.,	S2c
KIDDER, Rich (n)	R13c
KIMBY, Kenneth (n)	SM1c
KING, Leroy Francis	S2c
KOHN, James W.,	S2c
KUMMEL, Frank A.,	S2c
LABLING, George A.,	S1c
LE BARVRE, Leonard J.,	M1c
LE BUDA, Edward J.,	GSK(AA)
LEGGETT, Donald L.,	Y1c
LIFF, Carl C.,	S1c
LONG, Ernest "J"	W11c
LORICK, William R.,	FC1c
LULLON, Thomas J.,	GN3c
LUTHEMS, Charles F.,	S2c
LUNDAN, Steven (n),	111c
LURCH, John (n),	S1c
MANZELL, Charles F., Jr.,	SK2c
O'NEAL, James T.,	St11c
OLSON, Vernon A.,	SC2c
ORTHERSON, Bert O.,	F1c
PARSON, William H., Jr.,	CY(AA)(T)
PETER, Linder G.,	R13c
POCI, Thomas C.,	S2c
POSTON, Raymond (n),	F1c
PREAY, Norman A.,	GI2c
REMSBERG, Victor L.,	PH13c
REYNOLDS, William E.,	S1c
REYNT, Kenneth W.,	GI3c
RAYBURN, Sylvester A., Jr.,	GI3c
REYNER, Clair E.,	Cox.
RIPPA, Victor A.,	M11c
RIVKIN, Robert E.,	RdM2c
RIDER, Mark P.,	S2c
RIDER, Joseph F.,	M2c
ROCK, William R.,	M2c
RODNEY, Colin E.,	TC1c
RODRIGUEZ, Raymond S.,	S1c
RODFORD, Joseph E.,	GI3c
SCOTT, Everett G., Jr.,	
SCOTT, Mrs (n)	Cox.
STUPPARD, Lonnie P.,	S2c
SCHMIDT, William B., III	Q13c
SMITH, Hubert E.,	F2c
SUMNER, Samuel L.,	GI2c
SMYTH, Russell J.,	T13c
SHAW, Joe L.,	S1c
STAATS, William P.,	W11c
STONE, Joseph W.,	GM
SEEBACK, William J.,	S2c
SWARTZ, David H.,	S1c

(List of dead, continued)

STEELE, Bryon, Crosley (n)	S1c
STEFFARD, Carl W.,	CPM
STEWART, John E.,	WT3c
STEWART, Gordon C.,	S2c
STEWART, Clifford S.,	S1c
TUCKER, Earl W.,	St11c
TURNER, Loren E.,	WT2c
THOMAS, Vernon E.,	S1c
TROUSDELL, George E.,	M2c
TUCKER, Gerard J.,	S2c
TUTTLE, Jack S.,	FC3c
TEWY, Stephen (n)	F1c
UNDERWOOD, William L.,	S2c
UPCH, Harold S.,	SC1c
VOCHELS, Washington L.,	F1c
VAN FOSSEN, Frank E., Jr.,	M11c
WALKER, LeRoy S.,	GM (A)
WALKER, Vernon R.,	S1c
WOOD, Andrew E.,	G2c
WALKER, Jack W.,	S1c
WALKER, Harry A.,	S2c
WALKER, Antonio L.,	RT2c
WALKER, James F.,	S2c (RM)
WALKER, Herbert L.,	F2c
WALKER, William W.,	F2c
WALKER, Morris (n)	S1c
WALKER, Doyle D.,	So12c
WALKER, Ross G.,	FC3c
WALKER, Roy A.,	S2c
WALKER, Lawrence J.,	Y2c
WALKER, Chofric A.,	S2c
WALKER, Roman S.,	S2c
WALKER, Roland (n)	F1c
WALKER, Clarence C.,	ST3c
WALKER, Roger (n)	S2c
WALKER, Lester A.,	F2c
WALKER, Joseph A.,	S2c
WALKER, Rueben G.,	S2c
WALKER, Paul E.,	S2c
WALKER, Elmer G. H.,	S2c
WALKER, Ferley J.,	St11c
WALKER, Lawrence T.,	So13c
WALKER, Harold L.,	S2c
WALKER, Frank A.,	G3c
WALKER, Thomas E.,	S1c
WALKER, William C.,	M11c
WALKER, Bill Herbert.,	S2c

210. That the following eleven members of the crew of the USS WASHINGTON were seen to disappear from rafts or floater nets and no further report has been received concerning them; they are therefore presumed to be dead:

BEHREND, Marvin P.,	F2c
BENDIS, Carl E.,	S2c
BISH, Milton E.,	RT3c
BLOOM, Glenn C.,	S03c
BROOKS, William J.,	E12c
BROWN, Walter W.,	FC2c
BROWN, Paul (n).,	E2c
BROWN, James L., Jr.,	WT3c
BROWN, Charles S.,	G1c
BROWN, John (n).,	IS3c
BROWN, Benjamin E.,	WT3c

211. That no information has been received concerning the following seventy four members of the crew of the USS WASHINGTON who are missing and presumed to be dead:

BROWN, Lloyd Phillip	F2c
BROWN, Melvin Elmer	F2c
BROWN, Donald Robinson	IM2c
BROWN, Robert Leland	S1c
BROWN, Stephen Joseph, Jr.,	S1c(III)
BROWN, Harold (n)	F2c
BROWN, John David	F2c
BROWN, Robert McDonald	S2c
BROWN, John Wilbur	F2c
BROWN, William Daniel	RT3c
BROWN, Henry Franklin	S1c
BROWN, Chester Morton	S2c
BROWN, Lige Jr.,	S1c
BROWN, Benjamin Michael	S1c(III)
BROWN, Robert Archie	S2c
BROWN, Elmore Roscoe	WT3c
BROWN, Lawrence McNeil	S1c
BROWN, Edward Junior Jr.,	S1c
BROWN, Clayton	S2c
BROWN, John Daniel	S2c
BROWN, John Burton	S2c
BROWN, Larry Lynn	S2c
BROWN, Paul Walker	F2c
BROWN, Charles Robert	S2c
BROWN, Debor Locke	S2c
BROWN, Clifford Leon	TI2c
BROWN, Arthur Thomas	S2c
BROWN, Robert Gustave	F1c(III)
BROWN, John Joseph	S2c
BROWN, Thomas James	S2c
BROWN, John Edward	S2c
BROWN, Willard Joseph	S2c
BROWN, Clarence Floyd	S2c

211. (continued)

MCNEIL, Paul Joseph	S2c
MORAN, Ted (n)	S2c
MURPHY, Junior Clifford	S1c
MURPHY, Ralph Peter	S2c
MURPHY, Lester Junior	S2c
MURPHY, Charles "V"	S2c
MURPHY, Richard Paul	WT3c
MURPHY, John Douglass	G11c
MURPHY, Ernest Sidney	S2c
MURPHY, Fred Ireto	G13c
MURPHY, Alfred Burt	S1c
MURPHY, Elvin Kenneth	G31(T)
MURPHY, Harry John	B2c
MURPHY, William Frederick	I12c
MURPHY, Garrett Robert, Jr.,	SC3c
MURPHY, Howard Burton	I11c
MURPHY, John Charles	S2c
MURPHY, Harry (n)	S2c
MURPHY, Howard Thomas	SF1c
MURPHY, Robert Henry	WT2c
MURPHY, Don Roderick	S1c(GE)
MURPHY, Charles Emmett	WT3c
MURPHY, Stanley Palmer	S2c
MURPHY, Herbert Paul	S1c
MURPHY, Roy Eli	S1c
MURPHY, George Lester Jr.,	I13c
MURPHY, Melvin	S1c
MURPHY, Clarence Harold	S2c
MURPHY, Nolan Carl	S1c
MURPHY, Theodore Samuel	S2c
MURPHY, Joseph Charles Jr.,	RI3c
MURPHY, Layton William	S1c
MURPHY, Eddie	StM1c
MURPHY, Clifford (n)	S1c
MURPHY, John "D"	S1c
MURPHY, Arthur Berlin	GRI(PA)
MURPHY, Theron (n)	S2c
MURPHY, Herbert Erie, Jr.,	S1c
MURPHY, Gerald Clinton	S2c
MURPHY, William James	S1c
MURPHY, Stanley (n) Jr.,	S2c

212. That the following thirteen officers of the USS WARING-TO were seen to die by one or more witnesses or were buried at sea and are presumed to be dead:

ELMER, Jesse L., Jr.	Lt(jg) D-V(G) USNR
VICKERS, Sidney L.,	Lt(jg) SC-V(G) USNR
COOK, Robert E.,	Lt(jg) D-V(G) USNR
JOHNSON, Glenn W.,	Lt(jg) D-V(G) USNR
HART, John P.,	Lt(jg) D-V(G) USNR
DAVIS, Kenneth S.,	Lt D-V(S) USNR
LAMERSSEN, Thomas S.,	Ens E-V(G) USNR
ROGERS, William H.,	Ens D-V(G) USNR
SULLIVAN, John R.,	Ens D-V(S) USNR
DENEY, John, Jr.,	Lt(jg) D-V(G) USNR

212. (Continued)

PACK, Coleman S.,
DICKIN, James A.,
HIGLEY, Louis R.,

Lt(jg) D-V(G) USNR
Ens D-V(G) USNR
Lt(jg) D-V(G) USNR

213. That no information has been received concerning the following two officers of the USS WARRINGTON; they are missing presumed to be dead:

HELDY, Robert E.,
MERRILL, William V.,

Lt(jg) MC-V(G) USNR
Lt(jg) E-V(G) USNR

214. That all surviving personnel suffered from shock and exhaustion; further injuries were sustained by surviving personnel as set forth in exhibit 180.

OPINION

1. That the USS WARRINGTON finally sank because water entering the vessel, virtually unchecked by any human effort, flooded all the main machinery spaces, the living compartments aft, the steering engine room and certain compartments forward, through:

- (a) Unclosed ventilation systems.
- (b) Unclosed or improperly closed forced draft blower intakes.
- (c) Some deck hatches and doors.

And that there was no rupture to the hull of plating thereof, nor damage to any boiler uptake which caused any flooding.

2. That the deaths among the personnel of the USS WARRINGTON were due principally to drowning, exhaustion, exposure, and mental and physical disorders incident to drinking salt water.

3. That the deaths of the personnel of the USS WARRINGTON as listed in facts 209, 210 and 211 were incurred in line of duty and were not the result of their own misconduct; further that the injuries received by surviving personnel of the USS WARRINGTON were incurred in the line of duty and not as the result of their own misconduct.

4. That many of the personnel lost or who died might have been saved:

- (a) Had a more timely attempt been made to communicate the plight of the USS WARRINGTON to the USS HYADES.
- (b) Had all personnel been equipped with life jackets upon abandoning ship.
- (c) Had a vessel been in the immediate vicinity of the USS WARRINGTON when she sank.
- (d) Had the USS HYADES intercepted the distress message of the USS WARRINGTON as broadcast over NCS 101, then taken up the search for the USS WARRINGTON at 0400 on 13 September.

Dec 1944

- (e) Had personnel been equally distributed among the available rafts and nets.
- (f) Had better discipline and order been maintained among personnel in the rafts.
- (g) Had not the water supply of some rafts been list.
- (h) Had the USS HYADES at about 0600, 13 September, made an intelligent evaluation of the intercepted message concerning a vessel in distress and then taken suitable action.
- (i) Had the USS HYADES in her dispatch at 1148 13 September to ~~Commandant~~ ^{SEA} given a full and true report of condition, thereby enabling action to be taken which would have brought about the return of the USS HYADES to the distress locality at least 14 hours earlier than actually occurred.
- (j) Had the USS HYADES promptly complied with CinCLant's directive to go to the USS WARRINGTON's assistance, thus placing her in the distress locality at least six (6) hours earlier than actually occurred.
- (k) Had the discovery of the survivors taken place at any time earlier than the second day after the sinking of the USS WARRINGTON.
- (l) Had the USS HYADES immediately reported the discovery of survivors instead of delaying for over two hours, thereby enabling planes and other searching vessels to reach the immediate locality earlier than actually occurred.

5. That the responsibility for the sinking of the USS WARRINGTON and the subsequent large loss of life exists with: Commander _____, USN, Commanding Officer, USS WARRINGTON; and Commander _____, USN, Commanding Officer, USS HYADES and Officer in Charge of the movement; to a lesser degree with Lieutenant _____, USN, Executive Officer, USS WARRINGTON and Lieutenant (jg) W. V. Keyel, USN, Executive Officer, USS WARRINGTON, and to a minor degree with Lieutenant (jg) J. C. Farrington, USN, First Lieutenant and Damage Control Officer, USS WARRINGTON.

6. _____

File B6

8.

9. That Lieutenant W. V. Kappel, U.S. Naval Reserve (deceased) the Engineer Officer of the USS WARRINGTON was culpably inefficient in the performance of his duties. The mal-operation and mal-functioning of his engineering plant, his unauthorized and unwarranted abandonment of certain compartments and his alarming and misleading reports to the Commanding Officer contributed greatly to the loss of the USS WARRINGTON. J2

10. That Lieutenant J. M. Fennington, U.S. Naval Reserve (deceased) was negligent in the performance of his duties as First Lieutenant and Damage Control Officer. J2

11. That Lieutenant L. R. Kroll, U.S. Naval Reserve exhibited the highest degree of zeal, initiative, judgment, courage, and leadership and was an inspiration to the personnel of the USS WARRINGTON throughout the crisis. His unceasing efforts to save the USS WARRINGTON and his efforts to help personnel in the water undoubtedly led to the loss of his life; his performance of duty and actions are considered to be in accordance with the highest traditions of the Naval Service.

12. That it appears that certain irregularities existed in the Communication Department of the USS HYADES, especially during the period 2000, 12 September to 2000, 13 September, as evidenced by the fact that the USS HYADES radio log shows a satisfactory receipt of all traffic except that pertaining to the USS WARRINGTON.

13. That the weather advisory despatches originated by the various activities were influenced by local concern in the predictions as to the probable path of the storm but that the information given as to the location of the center of the storm was reasonably uniform and accurate and, in general, did not engender confusion in the minds of the Commanding Officers.

14. That further study and experiments should be conducted in connection with life saving equipment, i.e., rafts, nets, lifejackets and raft accessories in the light of the experiences encountered by the personnel of the USS WARRINGTON.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1.

2.

3.

4. That a suitable recognition be awarded (posthumously) in the case of Lieutenant (junior grade) Louis R. Kroll, U.S. Naval Reserve; that such citation cover paragraph 11 (a) and 11 (b) of the court's "Opinion".

ALL 36

The record of proceedings of the thirty-eighth day of the inquiry was read and approved, the court being cleared during the reading of so much thereof as pertains to the proceedings in cleared court, and the court having finished the inquiry, then at 2:15 p.m., November 29, 1944, adjourned to await the action of the convening authority.

Captain, U.S. Navy,
President.

Commander, U.S. Naval Reserve,
Judge Advocate.

OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL

NAVY DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

JAG:I:LJF:edn

17-24/25-83

7 MAY 1947

To: Commander Service Forces Atlantic Fleet

Subj: Official Documents - Change of classification of.

Ref: (a) Art. 76 (5) (b), Navy Regulations 1920.
(b) Ct. of Inq. - Loss of USS WARRINGTON; conv. by ComSerForLant, 16 Sept. 1944 (SECRET).
(c) Inves. - Action of personnel of USS HYADES in connection with loss of USS WARRINGTON; ord. by CominChLantFlt, 15 Sept. 1944 (CONFIDENTIAL).
(d) Admin. Rpt. - Loss of USS WARRINGTON; sub. by CO USS WARRINGTON, 25 Sept. 1944 (SECRET).

1. In accordance with reference (a), the classifications of references (b), (c), and (d), are hereby downgraded from Secret and Confidential to Nonclassified.

2. Please change your records accordingly.

By direction of the Judge Advocate General.

/s/

Captain, U.S.N.

CC:
Op 211C
BuPers
BuMed
BuShips
CNO
CominChLantFlt
CO, USS HYADES
Com 5
ComDes, US LantFlt.
CominCh, US Flt.
ComTaskFor-29
CO, USS GRADY
Cdr
Cdr
Lt
Capt

1, USN
(DE), USNR
(U), USNR
USN

ALB

Pers-3209:MM
DD383

2- MAY 1946

End -4

From: The Chief of Naval Personnel.
To: The Secretary of the Navy.
Via: (1) The Chief of the Bureau of Ships.
(2) The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subj: Ct. of Inq. and Ct. of Inq. in Rev. - Loss at sea of USS
WARRINGTON (DD-383); deaths of and injuries to U. S. naval
personnel; conv. by ComServForLantFlt, 16 Sept. 1944.

Inves. - Actions of the personnel of the USS HYADES in connection
with loss of USS WARRINGTON; injuries to personnel of the USS
HYADES; ord. by CinClant, 15 Sept. 1944.

Admin. Rpt. - Loss at sea of USS WARRINGTON; sub. by CO, USS
WARRINGTON, 25 Sept. 1944.

1. Forwarded, recommending approval of the proceedings, findings, opinion
and recommendations in the attached cases and the actions of the convening
and reviewing authorities thereon, subject to the remarks of the convening
and reviewing authorities and the Judge Advocate General. Approval is
further recommended of the attached administrative report.

2. It is noted that Commander _____, U.S.N., and Lieutenant
(D), USNR, have been tried by general courts martial and
acquitted of charges growing out of this case. It is also noted that Commander
(DE), USNR, has been tried by general court martial.

3. In the opinion of the Chief of Naval Personnel there is matter of interest
contained herein, which within the purview of Title 34, Section 276, U. S.
Code, relates to the records of the following officers:

Commander _____, U.S.N.,
Commander _____, (DE), USNR,
Lieutenant _____, (D), USNR,

4. Transmission by registered guard mail or U. S. registered mail is author-
ized in accordance with Article 76(15)(e) and (f), U. S. Navy Regulations.

RECEIVED BUSHIPS SECRET FILE
DATE 7-6-46
ROUTE TO 5817
SHIPS FILE NO. DD383/41-1
ROUTE SHEET
SERIAL NO. 50617

Assistant Chief of Nav. Personnel

~~SECRET~~

W.C. 1036

153983

DEPARTMENT OF MEDICINE AND SURGERY

FOLLOWING SHEET

FILE NO.

End - 3

25 March 1946

HUMKD:HL:FJC

Serial No. 9102

To: CNO
Via: (1) BuPers
(2) BuShips

Subj: Ct. of Inq. and Ct. of Inq. in Rev. - Loss at sea of USS WARRINGTON (DD383); deaths of and injuries to U.S. naval personnel; conv. by Com-ServForLantFlt, 16 Sept. 1944.

Encls: (A) Inves. - Actions of the personnel of the USS HYADES in connection with loss of USS WARRINGTON; injuries to personnel of the USS HYADES; ord. by CinCLant, 15 Sept. 1944.
(B) Admin. Rpt. - Loss at sea of USS WARRINGTON; sub. by CO, USS WARRINGTON, 25 Sept. 1944.

1. Forwarded, recommending approval, insofar as matters relating to this Bureau are concerned, and subject to the remarks of the Judge Advocate General in the First Endorsement.

By direction of the Chief, BuMed:

~~SECRET~~

Captain (MC) USN



50617

ALL

Cp21G-peb
Serial 00575P21
(SC)A17-24/DD383
Doc. #137852
Doc. #152204
Doc. #192970

20 MAR 1946

End - 2

From: Chief of Naval Operations
To: Chief of the Bureau of Ships.
Via: (1) Chief of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.
(2) Chief of Naval Personnel.

Subj: Ct. of Inq. and Ct. of Inq. in Rev. - Loss at sea
of USS WARRINGTON (DD383); deaths of and injuries
to U.S. naval personnel; conv. by ComServForLant-
Flt, 16 Sept. 1944.

Inves. - Actions of the personnel of the USS
HYADES in connection with loss of USS WARRINGTON;
injuries to personnel of the USS HYADES; ord. by
CinCLant, 15 Sept. 1944.

Admin. Rpt. - Loss at sea of USS WARRINGTON; sub.
by CO, USS WARRINGTON, 25 Sept. 1945.

1. Forwarded. Please return to the Chief of Naval
Operations after endorsement by the last addressee.

By direction

RECEIVED
MAR 21 4 35 PM '46
DUSTAL M
MEDICAL AND SURGERY
SECRET CONFIDENTIAL

~~SECRET~~
50617

ADDRESS AND
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL

NAVY DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

AND REFER TO

JAG:LiJLP:hf
(SC)A17-24/DD383
Doc. #187852
Doc. #152204
Doc. #192970

17 DEC 1944

End--1

To: BuShips
Via: (1) CNO
(2) BuMed
(3) BuPers

Subj: Ct. of Inq. and Ct. of Inq. in Rev. - Loss at sea of USS WARRINGTON (DD383); deaths of and injuries to U.S. naval personnel; conv. by ComServForLantFlt, 16 Sept. 1944.

Encls: 1 (A) Inves. - Actions of the personnel of the USS HYADES in connection with loss of USS WARRINGTON; injuries to personnel of the USS HYADES; ord. by CinCLant, 15 Sept. 1944.
✓ (B) Admin. Rpt. - Loss at sea of USS WARRINGTON; sub. by CO, USS WARRINGTON, 25 Sept. 1944.

1. Forwarded for recommendation.
2. Although the bodies of the U.S. Naval personnel, listed as missing, were not recovered, the circumstances attendant upon the subject disaster justify a conclusion that they are dead.
3. The Secretary of the Navy held on 13 January 1945 that the deaths of and injuries to U.S. naval personnel, resulting from the subject disaster, were incurred not as the result of their own misconduct.
4. The determination of the question of line of duty is not now necessary in the cases of the U.S. naval personnel mentioned in paragraph 3 hereof.
5. Enclosure (A) discloses that certain U.S. naval personnel on board the USS HYADES sustained injuries. While the investigating officer in this case did not express an opinion thereon, it is the opinion of the Judge Advocate General, from the evidence adduced in the record, that the injuries to the aforementioned U.S. naval personnel of the USS HYADES were incurred not as the result of their own misconduct.
6. It is noted that no expression of opinion on the question of line of duty is set forth in the record (Enclosure A) in the cases of the U.S. naval personnel mentioned in paragraph 5 hereof. Although it is not necessary at this time to determine the question of line of duty, the investigating officer in these cases should have expressed an opinion thereon. C.M.C. 10, 1937, 5, 5.

JAG:I:JLP:hf
(SO)A17-24/DD383
Doc. #137852
Doc. #152204
Doc. #192970

7. It is further noted that Commander [redacted] U.S.N., Commander [redacted] U.S.N.R., and Lieutenant [redacted] U.S.N.R., have been tried by general court martial upon charges growing out of this case. Commander [redacted] and Lieutenant [redacted] were acquitted. The record of proceedings of the trial by general court martial of Commander Weyland has not been received in this office.

8. Subject to the above remarks, and to the remarks of the convening and reviewing authorities, the proceedings, findings, opinions and recommendations in the attached cases and the actions of the convening and reviewing authorities thereon, and the attached administrative report, are legal.

By direction of the Judge Advocate General:

U Colonel, U.S.M.C.

~~SECRET~~

50617

HULL 134

ADDRESS REPLY TO
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL

AND REFER TO

JAG:I:ROS:edn
(SC)A17-24/DD383
Doc. #155670

NAVY DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.



24 FEB 1945

End--1

To: BuPers

Subj: Ct. of Inq. and Ct. of Inq. in Rev. - Loss at sea of USS WARRINGTON(DD383); deaths of and injuries to U.S. naval personnel; conv. by ComServForLantFlt, 16 Sept. 1944.


Encls: (A) Inves. - Actions of the personnel of the USS HYADES in connection with loss of USS WARRINGTON; injuries to personnel of the USS HYADES; ord. by CirCLant, 15 Sept. 1944.

(B) Admin. Rpt. - Loss at sea of USS WARRINGTON; sub. by CO, USS WARRINGTON, 25 Sept. 1944.

Ref: (a) Ltr. Cominch and CNO to SecNav, dated 18 Feb. 1945, FF1/A17-25, Serial 00450.

1. Forwarded for action inviting attention to reference (a), in which the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations recommends trial of certain officers by General Court Martial.

By direction of the Judge Advocate General:



Captain, U.S.N.

~~SECRET~~ 10617

1663

COMINCH FILE

UNITED STATES FLEET
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
NAVY DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE DELIVERY
NO.



FF1/A17-25

Serial: 00450

18 FEB 1945

~~SECRET~~

From: Commander in Chief, United States Fleet
and Chief of Naval Operations.
To: The Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Court of Inquiry to Inquire into the Circumstances Attending the Loss at Sea on or about 13 September 1944 of the USS WARRINGTON (DD383).

Enclosure: (A) Record of subject inquiry.

1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith.

2. In reviewing the record of the subject Court of Inquiry, it is noted that the Court recommended that Commander Samuel S. Quarles, U.S.N. (Commanding Officer, USS WARRINGTON) and Commander Morgan C. Wheyland, U.S.N.R. (Commanding Officer, USS HYADES) be brought to trial by General Court Martial, and

The reviewing authorities have in general concurred except to further recommend that Lieutenant [redacted] be also brought to trial by General Court Martial. I concur in these recommendations, to include Lieutenant

3. The record of the Court indicates that the loss of WARRINGTON was primarily due to operational and executive decisions resting with personnel of WARRINGTON and HYADES rather than to material or design features. Minor material defects are noted. I recommend, however, that the record of the Court be referred to the Chief of the Bureau of Ships for appropriate action.

4. It is noted that the Court recommended that suitable recognition be awarded (posthumously) in the case of Lieutenant (j.g.) Louis R. Kroll, U.S.N.R. for performance of duty on board the WARRINGTON. I strongly concur in this recommendation.

Warrington
A17-25
D. S. [redacted]
1723

RECEIVED S-C FILES

18 FEB 1945

NOTE TO: 18 FEB 1945
On File No. (or) A17-24/00383
Dist. No. 153071
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To: 2211

60711

50617

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ADDRESS REPLY TO
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL

MAIL ROOM
JAG: I: VCG: edn
A17-24/DD383
Doc. #205386

18 OCT 1946
End-7

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

A17-24/DD383

Subj: Ct. of Inq. and Ct. of Inq. in Rev. - Loss at sea of USS WARRINGTON (DD383); deaths of and injuries to U.S. naval personnel; conv. by ComServForLantFlt, 16 Sept. 1944.

Encls: (A) Inves. - Actions of the personnel of the USS HYADES in connection with loss of USS WARRINGTON; injuries to personnel of the USS HYADES; ord. by CinOLant, 15 Sept. 1944.

(B) Admin. Rpt. - Loss at sea of USS WARRINGTON; sub. by CO, USS WARRINGTON, 25 Sept. 1944.

1. The Secretary of the Navy has this date approved, subject to the remarks and actions thereon, the attached cases.

2. The Secretary of the Navy held that there is matter of interest contained herein, which, within the purview of Title 34, Section 276, United States Code, relates to the records of the following named officers:

Commander	U.S.N.,
Commander	(DE), U.S.N.R.,
Lieutenant	(D), U.S.N.R.,

By direction of the Judge Advocate General.

Commander, U.S.N.R.

CG:

DeFers

Fuller

Fuller

Comdr

Comdr

Lt

ComServForLantFlt

VEN	(with copy)
(DE), USNR	}
USNR	
	(1st & 4th.)
	(8th ends.)

No copies sent to Comdr
have been demobilized.

and Lt

- both

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED

From: ~~Secret~~
To: ~~Confidential~~
Auth: JAG Str. of 5/7/47

GCN
Date 137/177-3

~~SECRET~~

Finished file

Op21G-Jc
Serial 00922P21
(SC)A17-24/10383
Doc. 205336

~~SECRET~~

End 6

11 SEP 1946

From: Chief of Naval Operations.
To: Secretary of the Navy.

Subj: Court of Inquiry and Court of Inquiry in Revision -
Loss at sea of USS HARRINGTON (DD383); deaths of and
injuries to U. S. Naval Personnel; convened by
ComSeryForLantFlt, 10 September 1944.

1. Forwarded, recommending approval.

Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Administration)

~~SECRET~~

1 Prof. of Exhibits - (152204) 5 folders of Exhibits
Various Charts etc.

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37177

Section 5814

8-11987/111-1 (5814)
Serial 005296

~~SECRET~~

NAVSHIPS Ind-5

19 AUG 1946

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subj: USS WARRINGTON (DD383) - Court of Inquiry and Court of Inquiry in Rev. -
Loss at Sea during Hurricane - Deaths of and Injuries to U. S. Naval
Personnel - Convened by ComSerForLantFlt, 16 Sept. 1944.

Ref: (a) CNO Conf. ltr. OP-23-2-EM, Ser. 0292223(SC)882-3 of 4 July 1945.
(b) CNO Conf. ltr. OP-414-G-MM, Ser. 020P414(SC)883-3 of 18 Oct. 1945.

1. The Bureau of Ships notes that the loss of the USS WARRINGTON (DD383) was considered to be due primarily to operational and executive decisions resting with personnel of the USS WARRINGTON and the USS HEADES (AF28) rather than to major material or design deficiencies. It is further noted that a number of the portable covers for the ship's forced draft blower intakes were apparently not aboard ship upon departing from Norfolk although their removal had not been approved by the Bureau of Ships and that available portable covers and securing dogs were bent such as to hinder their effective use.

2. In regard to deficiencies in material under the cognizance of the Bureau of Ships, the following action has been taken:

(a) The Bureau is investigating all lifesaving equipment with the view of improving its efficiency. Consideration has been given to the possible replacement of floater nets with a more efficient type of equipment which can be used under the current limitations of weight and space aboard ship. Some of the equipments presently under consideration are rubber boats, life floats of new design (plastic shell fitted with Styrofoam), and a rubber impregnated canvas float filled with a buoyant fiber (Napek or Fiberglass). In regard to the above, it is noted that the Chief of Naval Operations approved the substitution of rubber boats in lieu of certain floater nets on destroyers and destroyer escorts in references (a) and (b).

(b) The weatherproofing of machinery space ventilation openings by increasing the height of (or relocating) present ventilation trunks and the provision of sliding hinged and hinged covers for weather openings have been authorized for destroyers. Plans and specifications for similar work on the inactive destroyers have been prepared; however, due to their present unavailability, the implementation of corrective alterations on these vessels has been

In view of the above, no further action regarding the subject casualty is recommended by this Bureau.

117-25/0D383

280336

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Return to 192970, 155670, 150646, 152701

Transmission of this document by registered mail inside the continental limits of the United States is necessary and hereby authorized.

By direction of
Chief of Bureau